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Abstract 
In this paper I test the predictions of tournament theory using panel data from international fencing 
competitions.  The theory predicts that for a given level of prize spread, agents’ effort incentives are 
reduced due to the asymmetry.  Using two measures of prize spread, I estimate the impact of these 
measures on performance for five separate skill-sorted cohorts using OLS and the Heckman 
selection model.  I find evidence of ordinal disincentive effects for fencers of a lower skill level, 
which is consistent with the predictions of the theory. 
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I. Introduction 
Tournament theory has important implications for the construction of optimal compensation 
schemes.  Tournament theory examines how agents behave when they are rewarded based on 
ordinal rather than cardinal performance.  In other words, the defining factor for receiving 
compensation is an agent’s output relative to his or her peer group, not the agent’s output in 
absolute terms.   
Corporate hierarchies are naturally structured to fit the tournament model: employees 
compete against each other for promotions and more prestigious job titles.  In these settings, it is 
often very difficult and costly to monitor employee output in absolute terms, but relatively simple 
and inexpensive to monitor employee output in relative terms.  As such, the employee who 
outperforms her peer group is advanced and reaps the benefits, while the others have to wait for 
the next round of advancement. The analysis of a corporate hierarchy thus becomes inverted: the 
high salary and extensive benefits available to company vice-presidents is not a reward for that 
vice-president’s output in his current position, but a reward for outperforming his peers while he 
was an assistant vice-president.  Empirical studies can show how various reward schemes affect 
incentive levels for performance and thus can help managers construct compensation schemes to 
entice employees to produce an economically efficient level of output by naturally pitting them 
against their peers.   
In this paper I test the predictions of tournament theory using panel data from international 
fencing competitions.  Specifically, I examine the assumption of asymmetric tournaments.   
According to the model, when agents vary nontrivially in skill, effort levels decline due to 
disincentive effects, especially for the weaker agents. Using econometric analysis I find evidence 
supporting the theoretical predictions of the tournament model.  For a fixed level of rewards, 
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weaker fencers have lower levels of effort incentives than stronger fencers.  These ordinal 
disincentive effects are reflected in lower finishing positions. 
Most of the empirical literature regarding tournament theory uses sporting events as a natural 
experiment.   I extend this analysis to international fencing competitions.  Fencing tournaments are 
a good setting for study for several reasons.  First, similar to other sports, data on these events is 
readily available, freely accessible, and (for the most part) complete.  Second, the competitors vary 
greatly in skill, and tournament organizers make no effort to equalize the field through 
handicapping.  In fact, the opposite is true –more skilled fencers benefit by having the privilege of 
competing against the weaker fencers first, making tournaments easier for the stronger fencers and 
more difficult for the weaker fencers.  This ensures that tournaments are highly asymmetric and I 
can safely believe any incentive effects I find are a reflection of this asymmetry.    
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the relevant literature and 
relates it to my own project, Section III provides an overview of fencing and its competition 
structure, Section IV covers the theory of the tournament model, Section V introduces and explains 
the data, Section VI discusses the methodology and results of the empirical specifications, and 
Section VII concludes with closing remarks and recommendations for future research. 
 
II. Literature Review 
Lazear and Rosen (1981) developed the first model of tournament theory.  They showed that a 
pay scheme based on relative rather than absolute output yields the same efficient allocation of 
resources as a traditional pay scheme which pays according to MPL, provided the workers are risk-
neutral.  If they are risk-averse, then it is possible for the employees to prefer the rank-order pay 
scheme (this depends on the shape of their utility functions).   
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 Another theoretical paper reexamines one of the traditional assumptions of tournament 
theory which states more skilled agents prefer low-risk (that is, low-variance) strategies in order to 
preserve their favorable position whereas less skilled agents prefer high-risk (high-variance) 
strategies hoping that these strategies can offset their skill deficit.  Krakel and Sliwka (2004) 
consider an asymmetric tournament (players have different inherent abilities, and thus, different 
inherent likelihoods of success) which is conducted in two stages.   In the first stage, each player 
chooses his level of risk; in the second, each player chooses his level of effort.  The authors show 
that risk taking influences work incentives as well as the likelihood of winning.   Because of this, a 
dynamic range of subgame perfect equilibria are possible; more skilled players might choose more 
risky strategies, and less skilled players may choose less risky strategies.  These equilibria also 
depend on the prize spread, the shape of the cost function, and the magnitude of the difference in 
ability.    
 A series of empirical studies test the predictions of tournament theory.  Ehrenberg and 
Bognanno (1990) analyze data from the 1984 men’s PGA tour in order to confirm the theory that 
tournaments have incentive effects.  The authors’ econometric analysis uses a golfer’s score as the 
measure of output and a proxy for effort level.  The crucial independent variable is the prize level 
since this theoretically captures incentive effects; other variables are included to control for the 
individual golfer’s skill, his opponents’ skill, and the difficulty of the course.  The authors find 
considerable evidence suggesting higher prizes lead to lower scores, other things being equal.  The 
authors also show that tournaments with greater prizes affect entry by attracting more-skilled 
players.  As Ehrenberg and Bognanno discuss, their analysis does not consider risk levels associated 
with individual strategies (i.e., conservatively hitting down the middle of the fairway or risking a 
shot over a water hazard) but nevertheless are confident that the data conclusively supports golfers 
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respond to financial incentives.  This paper will apply a similar empirical methodology to control for 
the entry decision and differences in skill level  under a different sport - fencing. 
Becker and Huselid (1992) measure and include risk as a control variable in their empirical 
study.  They suggest that golf may not be an ideal data source because golfers, due to the 
sequential nature of the sport, cannot directly influence each others’ actions.    For their own 
analysis, Becker and Huselid look at auto racing, a sport where the strategies of the competitors 
have direct effects on each others’ actions.   The authors analyze two professional circuits: the 
National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR) and the International Motor Sports 
Association (IMSA).  For given races, the authors collect data on adjusted finishing position, spread 
of the prize money, percentage of the purse going to the top finishers, the number of caution flags 
(which are penalties against racers), race length, and average speed.  The authors run multiple 
specifications for each auto racing circuit with adjusted finish as the dependent variable; the 
variation in the specifications arises in the finishing place length of the spread variables.  The 
authors find that variations in prize money spread between high and low finishes has a significant 
impact on performance.  Also, the authors show that risky behavior, as measured by the number of 
caution flags, increases when the spread exceeds the sample mean by more than one standard 
deviation.  The specification chosen by Becker and Huselid is the starting point for the specifications 
presented in this paper.  Specifically I use an incentive variable and a position variable which are 
constructed in a manner very similar to theirs. 
Empirical studies exist also in other settings beyond professional sports.  Knoeber and 
Thurman (1994), using data from the broiler chicken production industry and analyzing both linear 
(marginal product of labor) and tournament evaluation schemes, attempt to test the three main 
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predictions of tournament theory: changes in prize structures which do not affect the prize spread 
(relative prize distribution) will not have an impact on performance; more able players will chose 
low-variance strategies; and handicapping, which effectively closes the skill gap between players in 
an asymmetric tournament, can rectify disincentive effects.  The authors find that the performance 
of producers does not change if the baseline prize changes while keeping the relative reward 
structure constant.  They also find a negative relationship between producer ability and producer 
variability.  Finally, by examining the differences between the linear and tournament reward 
scheme they find evidence of handicapping which increases effort effects.  These conclusions 
support the predictions made by tournament theory.  The discovery of these results in an industrial 
setting is very encouraging since it is the first empirical study which confirms the utility of the 
tournament model outside the narrow realm of sports. 
It is important to note that Knoeber and Thurman cannot directly test the effects of 
asymmetry since regulators have handicapped the industry.  The effects of this handicapping are 
already present in the data, making it impossible to directly analyze production in the broiler 
chicken industry in absence of handicapping.  My paper seeks to fill in the gap in the empirical 
literature by examining an asymmetric tournament where the organizers implicitly encourage 
heterogeneity.   
More recently, empirical studies has focused on the level of individual strategy.  The 
resulting literature mostly deals with efficient levels of risk and is overwhelmingly empirical.  These 
studies use professional sports as a source of nonexperimental data.  For example, Klaasen and 
Magnus (2009) use the example of service strategy in tennis to answer whether economic agents 
are truly successful optimizers.  They first present a theoretical model relating the probability of a 
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fair service x to the conditional probability of winning a point given a fair service y(x).  Using data 
from Wimbledon, the authors observe the frequency of successful services on the first and second 
attempts x1 and x2 and their corresponding frequencies of resulting in winning the point on either 
attempt (measured by y1 and y2).  Using this data, the authors estimate probabilities for the above 
using a generalized method of moments.  The authors conclude that inefficiency in service strategy 
exists, being on average 1.1% for men and 2.0% for women.  If these inefficiencies are corrected, 
the authors contend that the new optimal strategy could potentially result in salary increases of 
18.7% and 32.8% for men and women, respectively.  
 In another empirical study, Lee (2004) uses the television show World Poker Tour as a 
natural experiment to examine whether agents respond optimally to prize incentives for given risk 
levels in a tournament setting.  Because riskier strategies in poker inherently are the result of more 
betting, the author uses the absolute value of the variation of an individual’s chip count over the 
course of a given tournament as a measure for risk taking.  The author regresses risk taking on the 
marginal increase in prize money by advancing one rank, the marginal decrease in prize money by 
decreasing one rank, chip count variance between the nearest leader and follower, and a vector for 
various control variables.  It is important to note that all prize structures in World Poker Tour 
tournaments are convex, so the gain by increasing one rank is not equal to the loss by decreasing 
one rank.  The author concludes that expectation of gains and losses does influence the amount of 
risk taking by a player.  When holding other explanatory variables constant, larger expected gains or 
smaller expected losses increase incentives for risk-taking.  Also, a player’s response to expected 
gains and losses are highly asymmetric –a player responds much more strongly to expected losses 
than to expected gains.  While this evidence may initially appear to weaken Krakel and Sliwka’s 
theory, it is important to note that there is insufficient information as to the card players’ skill level 
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an cost functions (except perhaps in the limited sense of using opportunity cost as an ex-post 
measure in case a given strategy leads to failure).  Ultimately Lee’s work illustrates a specific 
subgame perfect equilibrium which supports the traditional tournament model conclusion without 
directly refuting Krakel and Sliwka.   
 
 
III. An Overview of Fencing 
In this section I describe modern competitive fencing, paying particular attention to epee 
competitions.  I also describe the structure of the international tournaments which serve as the 
basis for my data. 
 
Modern Fencing 
Modern competitive fencing is called Olympic fencing to distinguish it from other versions of 
the sport which place more emphasis on the recreation of historic swordplay than athletic 
competition.  Olympic fencing is scored by touches.  Since actions happen to quickly, an electric box 
wired to the fencer’s weapon is used to determine if he or she has landed a valid touch.  Each 
individual match is called a bout and is fenced to a predetermined number of touches subject to a 
time limit. 
  There are three weapons with which a fencer can compete: foil, saber, and epee.  The foil 
is the oldest of the fencing weapons.  The blade has a rectangular cross section and is very flexible. 
A foilist is allowed to score only by landing the tip of the blade on his or her opponent’s torso, both 
front and back.  In addition, foil fencing is governed by a convention called right-of-way, which 
states that the fencer who first initiates an offensive action is awarded the touch in the event of a 
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simultaneous hit.  In other words, if fencer A attacks fencer B, fencer B must stop fencer A’s attack 
by deflecting the blade or retreating out of distance before initiating an attack and attempting to 
score.  
Saber is also governed by the convention of right-of-way but is fenced quite differently.  The 
blade is slightly shorter than the foil, and the guard wraps around to the hilt to protect the hand.  
All of the body above the waist is valid target area.  Saber fencers are permitted to score with either 
the tip or the edge of the blade, meaning slashing is permitted.  Saber bouts are extraordinarily 
quick, often over in a matter of minutes, and it is arguably the most physically taxing of the three 
weapons.  Because the modern electric saber is so light, it is much easier to attack than defend, 
leading competitors to develop overly aggressive offensive actions which, if employed in an actual 
duel, would be sure to get the fencer killed.  This makes saber the weapon which least resembles 
actual swordplay. 
The last weapon, epee, is modeled after the rapier, which was the civilian’s dueling sword 
during the Renaissance.  Many have described the weapon as a larger version of the foil.  The blade 
is thick, not very flexible, and has a sturdy triangular cross-section.  The bell-shaped guard is large 
enough to protect the entire hand, which is vital since the entire body is valid target in epee 
fencing.  Also, epee is not governed by right-of-way; each fencer can attack whenever they feel like 
it, and in the event of a simultaneous touch, both fencers are awarded a point.  The freedom 
afforded to the fencers makes it difficult to obtain a touch without one’s opponent also scoring; 
because of this, epee matches tend to resemble a game of cat and mouse, with each fencer 
attempting to deceive the other with feints and short pseudo-attacks. 
 
This paper examines epee fencing exclusively.  As mentioned above, epee is the least 
restrictive of the three weapons –fencers can hit anywhere, at any time, so long as they hit with the 
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tip of the blade.  New epee fencers are often astounded with this degree of freedom, thinking the 
possibilities for dynamic actions and complicated offensive attacks are limitless.  However, after a 
few bouts the fundamental law of epee fencing becomes glaringly obvious –just because you can hit 
anywhere does not mean you should hit anywhere.  Ironically enough, in being free to direct any 
sort of attack to any place on the opponent’s body, epee fencers learn that only a select few moves 
should be used on a select few target areas.  This is a result of the lack of right-of-way in epee 
fencing –complicated attacks require more time to set up, meaning an opponent can simply initiate 
their own attack during one’s initial preparation.  At its very core, epee fencing is a race, and the 
first one to make a hit wins. 
 
Fencing Tournament Format 
 All official fencing competitions are tournaments, and all of these tournaments have the 
same general structure.  Before competition begins, fencers are grouped into pools of between four 
to seven competitors.  These pools serve as the preliminary rounds of the tournament.  Each fencer 
in a pool fences another fencer in a three minute, five-touch bout.  After each bout, the final score 
and other statistics (how many times a fencer hit, how many times a fencer received a hit, etc.), and 
after each fencer has completed fencing all others in his pool, these scores are tabulated to give an 
overall score.  The purpose of this scoring in the preliminary pool matches is seeding –after pools, 
each fencer is assigned a ranking based on how well he performed.  After each fencer receives his 
ranking, the second round of the tournament –direct elimination –begins. 
 Direct elimination is conducted in a typical tournament-bracket style competition: the 
highest-ranked fencer first fences the lowest-ranked fencer, the second-highest fencers the second-
lowest, etc.  If the number of fencers in a tournament does not equal a power of two (which it 
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frequently does not) the field is adjusted accordingly by giving the highest-ranked fencers “byes” 
which are free passes to the next round.  Matches are now fenced to 15 and last for three 3-minute 
periods.  The winner advances to the next round and the loser is eliminated from the tournament. 
There is no fence-off for third place; both fencers eliminated in the semifinals tie for the bronze 
medal.1 
 
IV. Theory of the Tournament Model2 
In this section I summarize the relevant properties of the tournament model.  First, tournament 
theory models, which explain wage differentials in terms of relative rather than absolute 
performance, do a very good job of explaining scenarios such as athletic events or competition for 
positions within a corporation.  Second, reward schemes based on relative performance have very 
strong incentive effects.  In particular, the prize spread from one position to the next greatly 
influences the level of effort exhibited by the players. Third, the degree to which a tournament 
system is noisy is the degree to which individuals are rewarded (or punished) for reasons other than 
their relative performance.  Noise tends to decrease effort incentives.  The tournament organizers 
(an athletic coordinator, a corporate board of directors, etc.) can counteract this effect by 
increasing prize spreads.  Fourth, when individuals differ significantly in skill their effort incentives 
fall since in all likelihood the more skilled will receive the largest prizes regardless of effort levels.  
Effort incentives for both groups can be increased by handicapping the skilled individuals, but care 
                                                          
1
 The exception to this format is the Olympic Games.  At the Olympics, there is no preliminary pool round; fencers 
are ranked based on previous performance during the same year and immediately begin direct elimination.  Also, 
there is a fence-off for third place in the Olympics.   
2
 The explanation of tournament theory in this section is only a summary of the theory’s main characteristics.  
Readers interested in learning more should consult Edward P. Lazear’s Personnel Economics for Managers, chapter 
nine. 
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must be taken that the disincentives to the skilled are not so high that they avoid the tournament 
altogether. 
Explanations and Examples 
 Traditional economic theory explains income differentials in terms of a worker’s marginal 
productivity.  If Alice and Bob both hold manufacturing positions at Widget Corp’s factory, and Alice 
can make twice as many widgets per hour as Bob, the theory predicts that Alice  should command 
twice Bob’s salary.  Any other salary level for either Alice or Bob would present an opportunity for 
Widget Corp to make additional profits.  Given their productivities, it is only this difference –Alice 
earning twice as much as Bob –which preserves their employer’s indifference and makes Alice and 
Bob equally attractive. 
 This theory suggests that very small differences in income are due to very small differences 
in performance, and very large differences in income are due to very large differences in 
performance.  However, this is not always the case.  Consider a typical NBA Finals series against two 
teams which are nearly equally matched.  The winner of the series is the first team to win four out 
of the seven games.  There have been many instances where the opposing sides have battled and, 
due to their very similar levels of talent, forced a game seven winner-take-all scenario.  The team 
which wins (often by a slim margin) takes the NBA championship, which is often accompanied by 
increased endorsement deals for the star athletes and significant bonuses for each member of the 
team.  Meanwhile, the losers get nothing except for the consolation prize of a minor divisional title.  
Here is a case where the performance of one team only narrowly outstripped the performance of 
the other, yet the differential in “income” –money, prestige, etc. –was great.  In addition, these 
rewards are independent of the magnitude of the teams’ victories or defeats.  If the winning team 
13 
 
had won four games in a row and ended the series quickly, the prizes they received would not be 
any more substantial.  Clearly, absolute performance is not the only (or even the most significant) 
determinant of income in such scenarios.  Such scenarios are evidence of the tournament model in 
practice.  
 As mentioned in the introduction, tournament theory can also be applied to corporate 
settings.  As an example, let us revisit our analysis of Widget Corp.  The CEO and board of directors 
want to maximize the corporation’s profits, and a key component of this is to ensure that its 
workers are putting forth a level of effort consistent with their true levels of productivity.  The 
managers first turn their attention to Widget Corp’s marketing department.  Provided that workers 
in the marketing department are salaried (not paid by the hour or by unit of output), they have an 
incentive, once employed, to shirk and not put forth their highest effort levels.  Working hard 
creates disutility, and by offering a lower level of effort the workers increase their utility surplus.  
Obviously there is a lower bound to effort shirking –none of the employees would wish to withhold 
effort past a certain point due to the risk of being fired.   
What upper management truly desires is a low-cost method of getting their employees to 
put forth the level of effort which maximizes profits.3  As it turns out, the corporate employment 
structure, hierarchical by nature, is a highly effective method of inducing employees to put forth the 
optimum level of effort.  First, corporate employment structures have a fixed number of positions.    
The corporate ladder continues downwards with increasingly large numbers of positions as the 
                                                          
3
 It is important to note that there is a limit to the profitability of employee effort.  Higher effort levels which 
produce higher output levels require more pay, but due to diminishing marginal productivity this is not always 
desirable. 
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ladder descends.  Associated with each of these positions is a predetermined prize: the salary 
afforded to that position. 
It is clear by now that corporate hierarchy rewards those who are relatively more 
productive.  In this sense, tournament theory can be applied to employment situations involving the 
corporate ladder since the main criterion for the application of the theory –the use of relative 
performance in determining rewards –has been met.  Intuitively the reader may have already 
guessed that the most important aspect influencing employee effort, and the one which upper 
management has the most control over, is the reward structure associated with each advance in 
position, i.e. salary levels.  This highlights the importance of this paper’s empirical study: by 
gathering data and examining incentive effects researchers provide valuable information to 
corporate executives.    
When considering promotions as motivators, it is important to remember that it is the 
difference in salary a higher position commands which induces employees to put forth the optimum 
level of effort.  The actions of employees competing for scarce promotions and raises are influenced 
by the magnitude of this difference: Alice and Bob, both making $60,000 per year currently, are 
more likely to put forth more effort and compete more rigorously for a promotion which yields 
$100,000 per year than they would if the position offered only $80,000 per year.  Similar analysis 
applies to competitors in fencing tournaments.  Fencers competing in a bout are going to be much 
more careful and put forth much more effort in the single-elimination gold medal match than they 
would in the pools stage where the marginal consequences of an additional win or loss are 
relatively small in magnitude. 
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While the above insights are important, several key questions still need to be addressed.  
Returning to the corporate example, what are the benefits and costs associated between pay 
structures where lower level pay starts low and scales upward rapidly with promotions, versus 
relatively high-paying entry positions combined with moderate pay increases as employees climb 
the ladder?  Employees who find nose-to-the-grindstone effort levels and constant competition 
distasteful would prefer the second option; those who get a thrill out of a competitive environment, 
the first.  Contrastingly, corporate management wants to induce effort levels to be high, but not so 
high that they scare off their mid-level producers, who have an important place in the organization.  
At the same time, they want to make sure they do not attract only those workers with little 
ambition or passion.  They also want to induce an optimum level of effort for as low a cost as 
possible.  However, before upper managers can decide on an optimal rewards scheme, there is one 
last important factor which needs to be considered. 
The Effects of Chance 
 Chance –that is, good or bad events which are exogenous to the model –can significantly 
impact effort levels in the salary hierarchy.  These events distort effort levels away from the levels 
predicted by the tournament theory model (Lazear 1998). 
 As a general rule, the more noise in the system, the lower the level of effort exhibited by 
employees.  To see why, imagine the CEO of Widget Corp intervenes in the promotion competition 
between Alice and Bob.  The CEO decrees the recipient of the promotion will be decided by a coin 
flip.  Alice and Bob now have no ability to influence their chances of being promoted.  The 
probability of getting the better job is completely removed from their effort level and thus they 
have no incentive whatsoever to work on their presentations.   
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The entirety of tournament theory depends on these workers capitalizing on their ability to 
outperform their peers.  In the above case, infinite noise has been introduced; that is, the results 
have been completely removed from the effort levels of the employees.  In cases like these, 
workers will simply give up because they see that success or failure has been completely removed 
from their effort.   
The above case is an example of noise completely destroying effort incentives (“infinite 
noise”).  Of course, the amount of noise present in the competitive structure can take on other 
values.  Intermediate levels of noise are not only possible, but are in fact the most likely scenario in 
the real world.  Regardless, the administrators of the tournament (managers) must find a way to 
counteract the effects of noise so that the players in the tournament (employees) still have an 
incentive to actively compete with each other.  This can be done by increasing the prize spread.  If 
Alice and Bob are made the heads of to two different proposal teams, the noise associated with 
introducing additional players may cause Alice and Bob to reduce their effort levels.  By increasing 
the prize spread, most likely by increasing the salary of the position for which Alice and Bob are 
competing, upper management can counteract the effort-reducing effects of noise.   
Epee fencing is undoubtedly the “noisiest” of the fencing events.  Variability is large simply 
because luck plays a significant role due to the lack of protection from right-of-way rules.  
Combined with asymmetry, this is another feature which planners might find relevant.  Executives 
working in inherently risky businesses will likely find the results presented in this paper of even 
more significance than executives in “quieter” industries. 
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Heterogeneous Agents 
 When we first examined the effects of prize differentials on effort levels, we implicitly 
assumed homogeneity.  We will now adjust the model to reflect the asymmetry which we observe 
in fencing competitions. 
   As one might intuitively predict, a greater degree of heterogeneity among agents produces 
disincentives.  The less productive agents know that they are unlikely to catch their more 
productive peers even with considerable effort, so they shirk.  On the other end of the spectrum, 
the more productive agents know they are in little danger of being usurped by their less productive 
colleagues, so they also shirk.  The end result is high-productivity agents keeping their favorable 
position, often leading to promotion, with the low-productivity workers left behind, all without 
significant effort levels from either party.  This effect increases the greater the capability differences 
between the agents.  
 The chief motivation for this paper lies in the unlikelihood that tournament organizers will 
always deal with agents of uniform quality.  Hopefully the results I present can be used to highlight  
the inefficiencies created by disincentive effects and to lay the groundwork for effective policy 
countermeasures. 
 
V. Data 
 The data for this project comes directly from www.nahouw.net, the premier database for 
tournament fencers of international caliber.  For each tournament sponsored by the FIE (the 
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International Fencing Federation, the body which governs modern, Olympic-style fencing) data is 
recorded on the competitors, their performance, and their relative rankings.   
 This project’s data is taken from the 2007-2008 fencing season, which begins with the Kish 
Island, Iran World Cup in January and culminates in the Summer Olympic Games in August.  (The 
Olympic Games only partially affect the structure of the tournament fencing season.  Typically the 
World Championship Tournament is held in late summer/early fall, but in Olympic years the 
Olympic Games are used in lieu of the usual tournament championship.)  The dataset contains 
cross-sectional data at the individual competitor level spanning across the 17 FIE tournaments held 
over the 2007-2008 season yielding a panel data set. 
 The initial dataset contained 1948 observations.  However, many of these observations 
were outliers in the form of low-ranked fencers competing in a single tournament and remaining 
absent the rest of the season.  This is due to the FIE zoning requirements, which stipulate the 
number of competitors each country can send to a sanctioned tournament.  Typically the FIE allows 
a country to send between three and six fencers depending on the size of the tournament.  
However, the host country is given special dispensation and is afforded the privilege of entering 
significantly more competitors.  The result of this policy is that the host nation enters not only its 
usual elite fencers but also several others who are not competitive at the international level.  This is 
done for several reasons, such as “breaking in” up-and-coming fencers or giving fencers who are 
local-level champions the satisfaction of being able to claim they fenced in international 
competition.  As one would expect, these extra fencers finish towards the bottom of the field; 
coupled with their extremely low world ranking, this creates the aforementioned outliers. For 
example, the World Cup event held in Buenos Aires had a total of 21 Argentine fencers out of a field 
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of 46 and all but two finished in 25th place or lower.  In comparison, the country which sent the 
second most competitors was the United States, with only four fencers enrolled, all of whom 
finished higher than 20th place.   
 In order to more accurately capture the true incentive and control variable effects amongst 
regular competitive fencers, the sample size was restricted to those fencers which, at any time 
during the 2007-2008 season, were ranked within the top 100.  The reasons for this are twofold.  
First, the fencers past this threshold compete at least semi-regularly, with entry frequency 
increasing sharply as world ranking drops. Second, the points totals of the fencers ranked lower 
than 100 tends to become trivial very quickly, which is a reflection of true competitiveness (skill) 
and willingness to compete (entries).   The resulting dataset has a total of 763 observations and 
their summary statistics are listed in Table I. 
The measure of performance and effort is FINISHik, which is defined as the finishing position 
of the ith fencer in the kth tournament.  Although it may initially appear that the finishing position is 
a measure of absolute performance, this is not the case.  Finishing position is partly a function of 
skill but it is also heavily determined by the relative strengths of the fencers.  When a fencer wins a 
tournament, we make no claims as to his absolute skill level, only his relatively higher skill as 
compared to his competitors.  (Obviously, at the international level all fencers are very talented, but 
skill levels vary still vary significantly.)  FINISHik is the dependent variable in the main specification 
and its variations. 
The maximum value of FINISHik indicates that the lowest finishing position filled by a top 
100-ranked fencer was 184th place.  The large standard deviation relative to the sample mean is 
quite normal for epee tournaments and illustrates its noisy nature. 
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PSPREADk is the variable which captures incentives for better performance.  It is defined as 
the average difference in points awarded to the top eight competitors minus the average points 
awarded to the rest of the field.  The points awarded for each finishing position are fixed before the 
tournament even begins and are awarded based on relative performance, analogous to wages for 
positions within a corporation being fixed before that position is filled by an employee.  The 
variation in this variable comes from two sources.  The first, the official FIE point structure, occurs 
even before taking entries into account.  
The FIE decides how many points are awarded to each position; in one structure, the first 
place finisher is awarded 64 points and each subsequent finisher receives points scaled down by a 
power of two; the other points structure decreases similarly, but the first place position is awarded 
the lesser amount of 32 points.  The second is decided by the number of entrants.  The greater the 
number of entrants, the lower the average points awarded to the field finishing below the top 
eight, thereby increasing the value of PSPREADk.   The range of the data is approximately three 
standard deviations, which is encouraging because it suggests sufficient variation in the data to 
arrive at meaningful results. 
The cutoff point of eight is selected due to the nature of epee fencing.  Due to the rules 
governing its scoring, epee is the fencing event in which chance is most likely to play a significant 
role.  Similar to American football, it is not unusual “on any given Sunday” for a low-ranked fencer 
to upset a top favorite.  What makes an epee fencer skillful is not a few first or second place 
finishes, but consistent finishes in the top eight.  Indeed, if a fencer entered every tournament and 
finished eighth place in each, it would be very probable that this fencer would end the season as 
the World Cup Points Champion, simply due to the variability associated with the sport.  This is why  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics* 
Variable Name Description Mean S.D. Min Max 
FINISHik Finishing 
position of 
fencer i in 
tournament k 
44.058 38.528  184 
PSPREADk Avg. points for 
a top eight 
finish minus 
avg. points for 
rest of field 
28.856 9.482 14.767 43.728 
HHIk Herfindahl-
Hirschman 
Index of the 
kth 
tournament 
6340.187 1916.782 2169.263 9082.475 
STARTRANKik Rank of fencer 
i at beginning 
of tournament 
k 
42.076 27.548 1 100 
ENTRIESik Number of 
competitors in 
tournament k 
143.232 51.226 26 205 
AGEi Age of the ith 
fencer at the 
Olympic 
Games 
 
27.967 4.590 21 45 
MEANRANKk Mean of 
STARTRANKik 
in the kth 
tournament 
 
42.076 4.807 27.571 48.269 
TOPENTRYk** Number of 
top 16 
competitors in 
tournament k 
10.471 5.535 1 16 
*Statistics rounded to three significant figures 
**Tournament-level data with only 17 observations.  All other variables have 763 observations 
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in epee fencing, when one speaks of the “finals,” they are not referring to the gold medal match, 
but the series of bouts that begin in the round of eight tournament bracket.   
The expected sign of the coefficient of PSPREADk is not immediately obvious.   Since 
PSPREADk captures incentives for higher finishes, we might expect a negative coefficient (a higher 
PSPREADk leads to a lower i.e. “smaller-numbered” finishing position, which is actually indicative of 
better performance).  However, these fencing tournaments are highly asymmetric.  Fencers vary 
greatly in skill and tournament organizers make no effort to handicap these better fencers.  It is 
possible that PSPREADk might exhibit a positive coefficient, which would imply the highly 
imbalanced nature of fencing tournaments actually creates disincentive effects.  This would only be 
true if it is shown that tournaments with greater prizes attract more capable fencers.  I will 
elaborate on this in the methodology section; for now, we must acknowledge that the sign for the 
coefficient of PSPREADk has theoretical justification in both the negative and positive cases. 
An alternative incentive measure is HHIk, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the kth 
tournament.  I use this as an alternative to PSPREADk in several specifications as a check on 
PSPREADk.  This statistic, a measure of market concentration, is typically used by economists 
studying industrial organization and the theory of the firm.  However, it is also applicable to 
tournament theory as a measure of determining the magnitude of the prizes rewarded to the top 
finishers.   The points awarded to a specific finishing position are calculated as a percentage of the 
total points available, multiplied by 100, and then squared.  Each of these are added together to 
arrive at the HHI.    A high HHI means that the majority of the points are awarded to the top 
finishers and there is little benefit for those finishing in relatively lower positions.  A lower HHI 
indicates that prizes are more spread out and available to lower-finishing fencers.    The resulting 
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number is a measure of prize concentration, with an upper bound of 10,000.  The data shows that 
HHIk’s maximum value is close to this upper bound, but its minimum is significantly lower and its 
mean suggests tournaments of moderate concentration on average. 
HHIk is most useful as a measure of a fencer’s a priori expectation of tournament strength.  I 
will further elaborate on this in the methodology section.  Since the tournaments in question are 
asymmetric, there is theory supporting both positive and negative coefficients for the HHI. 
STARTRANKik, defined as the starting rank of the ith fencer in the kth tournament, is the 
first of the control variables.   It may be possible that this variable has some incentive effects as well 
–for example, fencers with a better (lower in numerical value) starting rank may have less of an 
incentive to put forth their best effort due to their already comfortable position, or they may in fact 
try harder (leading to finishing positions with smaller numerical values) in order to further solidify 
their elite standing.  Incentives aside, however, it is likely starting rank accurately captures a 
fencer’s skill over the course of a season.  As such, we expect a positive coefficient: the higher the 
starting rank of the ith fencer in the kth tournament (due to lack of effort, skill, or both), the higher 
his finishing position.  
ENTRIESk, another control variable, is defined as the number of competitors entered in the 
kth tournament.  The average tournament in the 2007-2008 fencing season had approximately 143 
competitors, which is much closer to its maximum value than its minimum value.  This degree of 
variation is typical for international fencing competitions 
 Like STARTRANKik, it is possible there are some incentive effects associated with entry, 
specifically that the decision to compete in the kth tournament may depend on the potential prize 
(PSPREADik) available in that tournament.  This will be discussed further in the results section.  In 
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regards to its affect on FINISHik, the theoretical prediction is a positive coefficient because more 
entries reduces the probability of any given fencer finishing in a high position, since there are more 
fencers competing for a predetermined number of better finishing positions. 
Another control variable is AGEi, the age of the ith fencer at the time of the Olympic Games.  
This variable is particularly interesting due to the nature of epee fencing.  The mean of AGEi, 27.5 
years, may be high for professional athletics as a whole but it is perfectly normal for epee fencers.    
Epee fencers peak very late in terms of the career of elite athletes, and it is not uncommon to see 
top fencers remaining competitive in their late thirties.  I included AGEi as a squared variable; 
theory predicts a negative coefficient, and it is possible that we may only observe the ascending half 
of the negatively-sloped parabola due to the aforementioned explanation. 
The final control variable is a measure of the strength of the competition in a given 
tournament.  MEANRANKk is the average starting rank of the fencers in the kth tournament.  The 
expected coefficient is negative; higher average ranks imply a less competitive field, leading to 
better finishing positions for the ith fencer.   
Also included are a series of position variables generated by interacting PSPREADk with 
dummies for fencers whose starting ranks fall within each of the eight-brackets (ranks one through 
eight for the first group, ranks nine through 16 for the second, 17 to 32 in the third, etc.) .  I 
included these terms order to discern whether the prize spread has differing incentive effects for 
for fencers of differing skill levels, which is entirely possible due to the asymmetric nature of the 
tournaments.  If there are differing incentive effects, the magnitude of the coefficients should be 
smaller for more skilled fencers (either more negative or less positive, pointing to lower finishing 
positions and hence relatively greater effort incentives).   
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The final variable, TOPENTRYk, is not a control variable in the main specification but a 
variable in a separate specification and correlation test.  It is defined as the number of fencers with 
a world ranking in the top 16 who enter the kth tournament. The reason I chose the top 16 for this 
variable stems from the noisy nature of epee fencing.  Although top honors are reserved for the top 
eight finishers, the degree of mobility through these top ranks is highest from the top 16; that is, we 
frequently see fencers from the top 16 break into the top eight, and fencers from the top eight fall 
to the top 16.  I felt defining the “elite” field as only the top eight too restrictive for this particular 
variable and including those other fencers who have a high probability of finishing in and being 
ranked in the top eight positions would yield more meaningful results.  Since this variable is 
tournament-level rather than competitor-level, there are only 17 observations.  I generated this 
variable in order to test whether a tournament with a larger PSPREADik (a greater purse available to 
the higher finishers) attracts tougher competitors.  The outcomes of the regression specification 
and correlation test (with PSPREADik) are presented in the results section. 
 
VI. Methodology and Results 
 Using the data described in the previous section, I estimate the following equation for the 
finishing position of the ith fencer in the kth tournament:  
  FINISHik   =   β0   +   β1PSPREADk   +   β2STARTRANKik   +   β3ENTRIESk   +      εik 
 
 Table 2 presents the results of several OLS specifications.  For each of these six 
specifications, the subsequent explanatory variables were added piecemeal as a sensitivity check.  
In the first of these (columns 1-3), all the control variables are present and PSPREADk is used as the 
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incentive variable.  The coefficients of STARTRANKik and ENTRIESk are positive, as predicted –the 
lower a fencer’s ranking, the lower he tends to finish, and the more fencers entered in a given 
tournament, the harder it is to finish in a favorable position.  AGEi and AGEi2 are negative and 
positive, respectively.  This too is expected since epee fencers start competing at a young age but 
reach peak performance much later than most professional athletes.  The positive coefficient of 
AGEi2 suggests that at a certain point, the marginal detrimental effects of an aging body outweigh 
the marginal positive effects of additional experience, which is true of any sport.  MEANRANKk also 
has a negative coefficient, suggesting that weaker fields lead to higher finishing positions for a given 
fencer, which is again in agreement with theoretical predictions.  All of these variables are 
significant at the one percent level, except for MEANRANKk, which is significant at the five percent 
level.   
 Interestingly, the coefficient of the incentive variable PSPREADk is positive and significant at 
the one percent level.  This suggests that a higher reward spread leads to worse performances.  
Remember that tournament theory predicts higher reward spreads tend to increase effort in 
performance in symmetric tournaments but may reduce effort and performance in asymmetric 
tournaments.  The coefficient of PSPREADk provides initial evidence that effort incentives are in fact 
dulled by asymmetric tournaments.   
 The OLS specifications in column 4 includes PSPREADk and several pairwise variables which 
vere generated by interacting PSPREADk with rank dummies to capture differing incentive effects 
for fencers of different skill levels.  The other explanatory variables have declined in significance, 
but all are still significant at the five percent level.  Of the incentive variables, PSPREADk and 
SIXTEENi are insignificant, but THIRTYTWOi, SIXTYFOURi, and RESTi are positive and significant.  All 
of these coefficients are positive, and the general trend in their magnitude suggests incentives for 
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higher effort levels and thus better performance are reduced for fencers of lower skill levels.  This is 
in-line with the results of the third specification, but is more informative since it captures the 
differing incentive effects for different competitors.   
 The next specification uses HHIk instead of PSPREADk as the incentive variable.  The other 
explanatory variables’ coefficients and standard errors have not changed significantly and HHIk is 
not significant at any acceptable level.  This changes slightly after generating interaction terms for 
different groups of fencers by interacting rank dummies with HHIk.  The results of these regressions 
are presented in the final two columns.  Ultimately, the results suggest that HHIk is an inadequate 
measure of capturing incentives. 
 The final OLS specification replaces HHIk with the pairwise variables interacted with 
PSPREADk to capture differing incentive effects for fencers of different skill levels.  The other 
explanatory variables have declined in significance, but all are still significant at the five percent 
level.  Of the incentive variables, EIGHTi and SIXTEENi are insignificant, but THIRTYTWOi, 
SIXTYFOURi, and RESTi are positive and significant.  All of these coefficients are positive, and the 
general trend in their magnitude suggests incentives for higher effort levels and thus better 
performance are reduced for fencers of lower skill levels.  This is in-line with the results of the third 
specification, but is more informative since it captures the differing incentive effects for different 
competitors.  
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Table 2 
Results of OLS Regressions       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PSPREADk 0.521** 0.543** 0.457** 0.056   
 (0.122) (0.122) (0.128) (0.194)   
STARTRANKik 0.551** 0.536** 0.545** 0.338** 0.545** 0.385** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.099) (0.042) (0.102) 
ENTRIESk 0.252** 0.255** 0.321** 0.320** 0.370** 0.376** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.038) (0.038) (0.036) (0.036) 
AGEi  -7.410** -7.508** -5.130* -6.980** -4.772* 
  (2.136) (2.131) (2.152) (2.195) (2.210) 
AGE2i  0.115** 0.117** 0.079* 0.109** 0.074* 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) 
MEANRANKik   -0.854* -0.912* -1.313** -1.428** 
   (0.404) (0.399) (0.386) (0.381) 
HHIk     0.000 -0.001 
     (0.001) (0.001) 
HHI16k      -0.000 
      (0.001) 
HHI32k      0.001 
      (0.001) 
HHI64k      0.003** 
      (0.001) 
HHIrestk      0.002 
      (0.001) 
SIXTEENi    -0.005   
    (0.012)   
THIRTYTWOi    0.317*   
    (0.147)   
SIXTYFOURi    0.669**   
    (0.182)   
RESTi    0.555*   
    (0.267)   
Observations 763 763 763 763 763 763 
R-squared 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.34 0.36 
Standard errors in parentheses       
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       
 
     
The coefficients have the expected sign, and they suggest that asymmetric tournaments 
create disincentive effects.  However, this only holds if tournaments with higher prize spreads 
attract more capable fencers.  Fortunately, we can use the data to test this premise.  By looking at 
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tournament-level data rather than competitor-level data, we can conduct two simple tests to see 
whether tournaments with higher prize spreads attract more capable fencers.  First, we can 
correlate PSPREADk with the variable TOPENTRYk.  Second, we can regress TOPENTRYk on 
PSPREADk. 
The data shows that the correlation coefficient of PSPREADk and TOPENTRYk is 0.694.  The 
correlation is high, but not definitively so.  The regression results are more convincing, however: 
 
Table 3 
Tournament Strength Check   
OLS 
PSPREADk     0.373** 
                 (0.100) 
Observations     17 
R-squared     0.48 
Standard errors in parentheses  
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
 
 
These results, significant at the one percent level, suggest that increasing the point spread by 
approximately three points draws one additional elite fencer into the field.  Considering 
observations for PSPREADk come in increments separated by much more than three points, we can 
conclude that the above results are applicable.  Tournaments which promise higher rewards do 
attract stronger fencers, lending weight to the results of the main OLS specifications.   
 
Selection 
 There is one other aspect of the data which has not yet been discussed –the panels are 
highly imbalanced.  Only a small number of competitors attend all the tournaments, and several 
attend only one or two.  After rectangularizing the dataset, I discovered that 45.5% of observations 
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were missing.  In other words, adjusting the dataset such that each fencer was listed for each 
tournament whether they attended or not shows the “average” fencer missed nearly half the 
tournaments! 
 This is concerning for two main reasons.  First, the highly imbalanced nature of the panels 
made the fixed effects model infeasible – the vast majority of the competitor dummies were 
dropped by the software package when I attempted to run the regression.  However, I believe this 
is somewhat mitigated by breaking the incentive variable into components based on a fencer’s 
ranking (see the results of the final OLS specification).   
 The second problem is more concerning.  A fencer’s decision to enter a tournament or not is 
not random.  The fencer makes his decision to enter based on a number of different factors; 
because of this, the OLS results are most likely subject to selection bias.  To account for these 
factors, I used the Heckman selection model. 
 The Heckman selection model is a two-step process including an OLS regression and a probit 
regression.  It is the probit regression which serves as the selection component.  In this case, we can 
use information based on whether a fencer enters a tournament or not to improve the estimates of 
the explanatory variables in the OLS model.            
 For fencer i in tournament k, the probit regression has the following form: 
    
PROFik  =     α1PROHHIk      +      α2PROSTARTRANKik      +     α3HOMECOUNTRYi     +       μik 
 
where PROF is a dummy variable for entry, PROHHI and PROSTARTRANK are the same as their OLS 
counterparts except for the missing observations, which are now filled in, HOMECOUNTRY is a 
dummy variable for whether the kth tournament is located in the ith fencer’s home country, and μ 
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is a standardized normal error term.  The results of the probit regression, along with the 
explanatory variables’ marginal effects, are reported below. 
 
Table 4 
Probit Results   
 (1) 
Probit 
(2) 
Marginals 
PROHHIk 0.000** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
PROSTARTRANKik -0.010** -0.004** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations           1316    1316 
 
Standard errors in parentheses   
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
 
 
 The defining feature of the Heckman selection model is the presence of excluded 
restrictions.  These are explanatory variables present in the probit model but not in the OLS model.  
Without these variables which exclusively explain entry, the Heckman results would simplify to an 
OLS regression.  The two excluded restriction are HOMECOUNTRYi and HHIk.  The first is a dummy 
variable equal to one if a tournament is held in the ith fencer’s home country.  The second is used 
as an a priori estimate of tournament strength.  Since PSPREADk is not defined or known until after 
all entries are compiled, HHIk is an effective term to capture expectation while avoiding 
endogenous selection. 
  
The results of the full Heckman selection model follow.  Two models were tested: the first 
uses PSPREADk as an incentive measure, and the second again uses HHIk as a check. 
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Table 5 
Results of the Heckman Selection Model: PSPREAD    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Point Spread Point Spread 
(probit) 
Point Spread by 
Rank 
Point Spread by 
Rank (probit) 
PSPREADk 0.458**  0.086  
 (0.171)  (0.250)  
STARTRANKik 0.506**  0.335*  
 (0.055)  (0.133)  
ENTRIESk 0.343**  0.336**  
 (0.051)  (0.050)  
AGEi -7.221*  -4.652  
 (2.894)  (2.862)  
AGE2i 0.117*  0.077+  
 (0.047)  (0.046)  
MEANRANKik -0.969+  -0.938+  
 (0.531)  (0.515)  
PROHHIk  0.00025**  0.00025** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
PROSTARTRANKik  -0.010**  -0.010** 
  (0.002)  (0.001) 
PROHOMECOUNTRYi  7.180  7.178 
  (13,124.789)  (11,078.312) 
SIXTEENi   -0.005  
   (0.015)  
THIRTYTWOi   0.202  
   (0.200)  
SIXTYFOURi   0.762**  
   (0.240)  
RESTi   0.376  
   (0.354)  
Observations 1019 1019 1019 1019 
Standard errors in parentheses     
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
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Table 6 
Results of the Heckman Selection Model: HHI    
 (1) 
HHI 
(2) 
HHI (probit) 
(3) 
HHI by Rank 
(4) 
HHI by Rank 
(probit) 
     
HHIk -0.000  -0.001  
 (0.001)  (0.002)  
STARTRANKik 0.514**  0.364*  
 (0.056)  (0.143)  
ENTRIESk 0.396**  0.397**  
 (0.048)  (0.046)  
AGEi -6.842*  -5.339+  
 (2.934)  (2.871)  
AGE2i 0.112*  0.089+  
 (0.048)  (0.046)  
MEANRANKik -1.469**  -1.576**  
 (0.502)  (0.482)  
PROHHIk  0.00025**  0.00025** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
PROSTARTRANKik  -0.010*  -0.010** 
  (0.002)  (0.001) 
PROHOMECOUNTRYi  7.181  7.178 
  (14,503.508)  (12,321.334) 
HHI16k   -0.000  
   (0.001)  
HHI32k   0.000  
   (0.001)  
HHI64k   0.003**  
   (0.001)  
HHIRESTk   0.001  
   (0.002)  
Observations 1019 1019 1019 1019 
     
Standard errors in parentheses  
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
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Again, the results of the specification containing PSPREADk and its associated interaction terms are 
more robust and have greater explanatory power than the specifications containing HHIk and its 
associated interaction terms. 
 The coefficients of the explanatory variables are in-line with theoretical predictions and 
previous results.  Several of these variables have declined in significance even though they carry the 
same sign as in previous specifications.  Of these, STARTRANKik is just shy of the one percent level, 
and AGEi is just shy of the ten percent level.  Looking at the incentive interaction terms we see the 
same result as before: the relative magnitudes and significance of the interaction coefficients 
suggest disincentive effects for weaker fencers (or, alternatively, greater incentive effects for more 
talented fencers).   
 Examining the probit portion of the model, we see that fencers with less favorable rankings 
at the start of a tournament are less likely to enter.  The intuition behind this result is similar to that 
underscoring the incentive interaction terms in the OLS model: less skilled fencers are deterred 
from entering more tournaments.  This makes sense because fencers are very likely to be aware of 
the highly asymmetric nature of their competitions and, since effort creates disutility, are unlikely 
to compete given the low likelihood of receiving a prize (points) large enough in magnitude to 
justify the disutility of effort.   
Still focusing on the probit model, we find a positive coefficient for HHIk and a large t-score.  
This suggests that a fencer’s decision to enter a tournament is influenced by, and positively related 
to, the concentration of points available in a given tournament –the more the top finishers benefit 
at the expense of the rest of the field, the more likely a fencer is to enter.  This is surprising 
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considering our analysis of HHIk and the relative magnitudes and significance of the incentive 
interaction terms in the OLS portion of the model. 
Discussion 
 For the Heckman selection model, the probit analysis is likely subject to omitted variable 
bias, which may explain the unexpected coefficient sign of HHIk.  In addition to the variables already 
present in the probit regression, competitive fencers also base their entry decision on an 
expectation of the level of competition.  While it seems this would justify including MEANRANKik in 
the entry model, this is not possible due to the nature of the model –in estimating which fencers 
enter, we cannot use a statistic measuring characteristics of those fencers do end up entering.  This 
also precludes STARTRANKik and PSPREADk (the latter because it is dependent on entry based on 
the way the variable is constructed).  Not including these variables is necessary to avoid 
endogenous selection problems. 
  
VII. Conclusion 
In this paper I have provided empirical evidence supporting the theory of asymmetric 
tournaments.  Specifically, I show that, other factors being equal, higher point spreads lead to 
worse performances for a given fencer.  I also show that the effects of the prize spread are different 
for fencers of differing skill levels –while the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for stronger fencers, 
there is significant evidence suggesting weaker fencers face disincentive effects in the face of higher 
reward spreads.   
Because entry into fencing tournaments may be subject to selection bias, I corrected the results 
in the OLS specifications using the Heckman selection model.  Although the other explanatory 
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variables became less robust, the coefficients and signs for the incentive variables did not vary 
greatly from the OLS results and are still in line with the predictions of the theoretical model.   
These results are of particular interest since the empirical literature on asymmetric 
tournaments is sparse.  Knoeber and Thurman (1994) consider asymmetric tournaments in their 
paper, but in their study the tournament organizers handicap less able players to eliminate the 
presumed disincentive effects.  To my knowledge my work is the first study which illustrates the 
ordinal disincentive effects in a tournament not subject to handicapping. 
 Although the above estimations are not perfect, they nevertheless support the hypothesis 
that asymmetric tournaments produce disincentive effects; furthermore, the evidence suggests that 
these incentive effects are different for competitors of differing skill levels, a conclusion consistent 
with the theory of the tournament model.  To my knowledge, no other empirical study has 
confirmed the presence of disincentive effects in tournament settings.  These results are highly 
significant and merit further research. 
 The most obvious improvement would be to increase the sample size.  This paper examined 
data from a complete fencing season; it is not unreasonable to assume more robust results could be 
obtained from data sets spanning several seasons.  There are difficulties with this method as well 
(newly participating fencers replacing retiring fencers, differing tournaments, rules changes, etc.), 
and there is no guarantee that an expanded data set will also correct the problem of significantly 
imbalanced panels.  Nevertheless, running a similar study with a more comprehensive dataset at 
the very least would serve as a check against the results presented here. 
 Instead of simply expanding the dataset over the course of several fencing seasons, it could 
also be expanded to include female fencers.  I did not do this for my project because too much of 
the requisite data was missing.  Data concerning the performance and achievement of female 
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feners is not as meticulously kept as it is for men.  Fortunately this problem is being rectified (in 
international fencing events, at least); data from the latest fencing season, just compiled a few days 
prior to the writing of this paper, catalogued identical and complete results for male and female 
epee fencers.     
A further improvement method would involve adding the risk variable, RISKik, to the 
specification.  RISKik would be defined as the number of risky strategies used by the ith fencer in 
the kth tournament.  As stated before, I was unable to acquire satisfactory data for this variable.  I 
present and describe it here only because of its theoretical importance and my commitment to 
include it to the faculty during my proposal presentation.  Ideally, the risk variable would be 
included in the main specification in the same manner as Becker and Huselid (1992) even though 
the definition of risk in their specification differs greatly from the one presented here.  Becker and 
Huselid define risk as the number of caution flags in a given race, which is a reflection of unsafe 
driving which may cause harm or, albeit rarely, fatalities.  Risk in this paper’s specification is defined 
as any fencing technique which is dangerous to execute from a competitive standpoint.  That is, a 
technique is risky if it has the potential to fail and allow the opponent to easily score a point, not if 
it has the potential to injure.   Theory has no clear prediction as to the sign of RISKik’s sign.  It is 
possible that fencers may use fewer risky strategies as they advance, counting on their standard 
techniques to propel them to the highest ranks, or they may use more as they advance, hoping to 
catch opponents off-guard.  Intuitively we would expect stronger fencers to use fewer risky 
techniques so as to preserve their likely favorable finish and weaker fencers to use more risky 
strategies since they have little to lose seeing as their probability of placing highly in a given 
tournament is low, but Krakel and Sliwka (2002) prove a possible theoretical refutation to this 
claim. 
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The primary challenge is that the only way to reliably acquire this data would be to watch 
footage from every single match of every tournament in the data set.  Even if a researcher could 
acquire this data there is still the problem of subjectivity in asserting the level of risk associated 
with a given fencing technique.  One suggestion would to be to record the number of times a given 
fencer executes an unprovoked advance-lunge or fleche attack.  Others would advocate a rotational 
technical analysis based on the tactical wheel presented earlier in this paper.   
 A final improvement would require an adjustment to the dependent variable, FINISHik.  In 
other studies researchers have adjusted a variable describing relative finishing position  to arrive at 
an objective scale; for example, Becker and Huselid (1992) modify the finishing position of the 
drivers by multiplying the finish variable by a term for race speed.  Without adjusting FINISHik, we 
cannot say definitively whether the weaker fencers are actually have disincentives for performance 
or whether their incentives are simply weaker than those of stronger fencers.  As stated before, in 
the context of fencing tournaments these are flip sides of the same coin.  As such, the results still 
agree with the theoretical predictions, but they would be more convincing if it were possible to 
isolate either condition.  For simplicity’s sake, I have referred to the phenomenon in this paper as 
“disincentive effects” but readers should be aware of the ordinal, rather than cardinal, value of 
these effects. 
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